CAUCASUS: THE ARMENIA & AZERBAIJAN POWDER KEG MAKING HISTORY (AND MORE)
CAUCASUS: THE ARMENIA & AZERBAIJAN POWDER KEG MAKING HISTORY (AND MORE)
What follows is my English translation of an interesting article by Alessandro Fanetti published on ComeDonChisciotte.org yesterday, 3rd May 2024, especially in light of recent developments in the Caucasus region.
In particular, I am referring to the approval of the second reading (out of three) of a bill on foreign agents by the Georgian Parliament a few days ago and the ongoing protests (fuelled exactly by foreign agents, mainly from US and EU) against this law - please see these two articles (1 and 2) from Reuters for additional information - though the author did not mention these events.
While Reuters compares this bill to a similar law in Russia, it fails to mention in both articles that several Western countries have very similar laws, with the Outlaw US Empire being the first one in history to introduce it back in 1938, the so-called “Foreign Agents Registration Act”, whereas Russia enacted one only in 2012. The hypocritical Outlaw US Empire and its European vassals are complaining about Georgia rightly introducing such a law (I mean: why should you allow foreign NGOs to interfere in domestic politics?), however the UK introduced one last year and France earlier this year.
Anyway… enough from me for now, I will now leave the floor to Alessandro Fanetti and his article on the Armenian and Azerbaijani powder keg.
The Caucasus simmers and looms as one of the areas of fierce confrontation Unipolarism vs. Multipolarism.
A clash that, as in Ukraine, laps at the political West and should bring about a profound strategic and geopolitical redefinition of the elites that govern it. Before it reaches the point of no return (alas, increasingly around the corner).
This boiling of the Caucasus area is due to a number of factors, the most significant of which are the following:
historical failure to resolve disputes (primarily ethnic and religious) arising from both the Ottoman Empire and the USSR. In this light, of great significance for the past, the present and certainly the future, at least two facts should be noted:
What is considered for all intents and purposes in Armenia as a genocide (“Meds Yeghern” - Great Catastrophe) perpetrated against them by the Ottoman Empire and centred in 1915.
The dramatic “Armenian Christians - Azerbaijani Muslims” divisions also developed after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and left deep rifts both in the souls of the peoples concerned and territorially, with Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakchivan territory as hotspots of the conflict.
Armed clashes that were never resolved in the last years of the 1900s, primarily between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Clashes developed primarily in that very Nagorno-Karabakh also returned to the forefront in the 3rd Millennium.
Attempts by some Great Powers, and other more regional ones, to clash “by proxy”, thus using historical misunderstandings and centuries-old confined diatribes to attack and antagonize each other. In fact, if Stalin sought dialogue with Ataturk's Turkey even while somehow having "special consideration" for Soviet Azerbaijan (in any case with an Islamic and pro-Turkish majority) by assigning Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakchivan to it (much to Yerevan's displeasure), since the collapse of the USSR the instability in the Caucasus has developed with full force (read also Chechnya) certainly due to the inability of the Powers there to touch the right chords of pacification, but also due to external interference interested in putting “discord” in a sensitive area (for Russia primarily).
A powder keg, therefore, which was rekindled with the September - November 2020 War (where Azerbaijan took 75% of the territory called Artsakh from the Armenians) and then in 2023 with Baku taking back all of Nagorno-Karabakh with a blitzkrieg.
Blitzkrieg that saw on the one hand the objective impossibility of Armenia to fight on equal terms with Azerbaijan and on the other hand the ability of the latter nation to take advantage of the favourable moment.
Just think, as an example, of Azerbaijan's defence spending compared to Armenia (about 4 times more). [1]
With aftermath therefore “explosive” for the present and the future.
Favourable moment for Baku due primarily to international issues with positive reverberations for its expectations:
A strong alliance with Turkey (a NATO country), both for reasons of historical proximity (first and foremost on a religious level) and for Ankara's ambition to extend its influence over Central Asia with a strong Islamic and Turkish-speaking presence. Influence that is more easily extended thanks to the territorial continuity guaranteed by Baku.
The conflict in Ukraine has objectively placed Russia in front of an epoch-making commitment and therefore support for Armenia and the Pashinyan government (which has long been at loggerheads with Moscow) is not experienced by the Kremlin as 'existential'. In addition, Russia - Azerbaijan relations are far from negative, for example with Baku buying weapons from Moscow.
The Turkey - Russia balance is very delicate and is characterised by mutual concessions that sometimes displease the “minor” allies. See for example Assad in Syria (disliked by Turkey).
On the contrary, an unfavourable moment for Yerevan, with Armenia trying to disentangle itself between a relationship that is still present with Moscow (for the economy firstly) and the attempt to get closer to the political West (France and the USA first and foremost).
A very dangerous game and full of obstacles, that of the Pashinyan Government (also supported by a part of the opposition, which, on the contrary, calls for the breaking of relations with Moscow and the complete opening to NATO countries), inasmuch as the positive relationship that the West has with Baku, “willingly or unwillingly”, must not be forgotten, first of all, for the following reasons:
The substantial embargo on Russian raw materials (even if largely “self-circumvented” by buying from third countries) has led to an existential supply for Europe of Azeri products.
Baku's proximity to Turkey (a key pawn in the West's attempt to contain the Russians in the region) means that, even if it wanted to, it would be impossible for the West to “break” with Baku, on pain of the risk of going over the line with Turkey.
A detrimental and dangerous situation, therefore, for the entire region and beyond.
A very risky situation and one that has led to a situation of basically “general militarisation” in all the hottest areas of the disputed Armenia-Azerbaijan territories, as I also witnessed during my last trip there in 2024.
A situation that will realistically be impossible to pacify definitively, first and foremost because of the long and substantial incompatibilities in the reconstruction of the history of those lands and the populations living there, as well as the events that have occurred and that are read in diametrically opposed ways by the various warring parties.
But a “normalisation” of the situation is more necessary than ever, both to avoid suffering for the peoples inhabiting these magnificent lands and to ensure the right development capacity for an area that has much to offer itself and the world.
Normalisation that must necessarily pass through a discussion table where the direct protagonists of this perennial tension (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the regional players interested in the issue (Turkey, Iran, Georgia and Russia) can participate.
With one or more mediators capable of touching the right “strings”. As, for example, China did in the “normalisation” that took place between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023.
And as “not done” by the European Union [2], which continues on the one hand to host unfruitful Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogues (without having the necessary political clout and “quid pro quo” in that area) and on the other hand proposing or acceding to decisions that would inflame that part of the world instead of “relaxing” it (e.g. by promising improbable EU membership).