RAW MATERIALS, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE WORLD WARS OF YESTERDAY AND TODAY

Today I am providing my English translation of an interesting article by Domenico Moro, originally in Italian and published on ComeDonChisciotte.org on Monday 16th February 2026. (Italics original, bold emphasis mine).

Recently, the United States has promoted the establishment of a massive strategic reserve of raw materials, Project Vault, which, according to Trump, is modelled on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, established during the oil crisis of the 1970s. The aim today is to achieve autonomy from China and other non-allied countries, not only in commercial terms but also in military terms. The Trump administration, moreover, is basing its strategy on the explicit threat of military force. The US Department of War’s (as the Department of Defence has been renamed, not by chance) 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states its intention to achieve “peace through strength”. In practice, the US wishes to build up such overwhelming military strength that it can fight on multiple fronts simultaneously, thereby achieving deterrence against China and, consequently, control of the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. Although the stated objective is peace, what actually results is the creation of conditions under which the US can win a 21st-century world war, just as it won the two world wars of the 20th century.

According to the NDS, there are essentially two conditions that would enable the objectives of strategic superiority to be achieved: the development of the military capabilities of allies, who, according to Trump, have so far relied too heavily on US aid; and the rebuilding of a strong industrial base in the US. This base should not be limited to the strictly military industry, but should be extended to all strategic industrial sectors, which have weakened in recent decades due to offshoring and deindustrialisation. Having an industrial base capable of exercising global hegemony also means, above all, having control over the raw materials necessary for manufacturing, starting with metals and energy.

Economic strength has always been decisive in achieving victory in war. This is even more true in modern wars. The two world wars were won by those who had the strongest industrial apparatus, the greatest financial resources and the most abundant access to all the raw materials necessary for the war effort. As the historian Niall Ferguson has stated, Germany lost the two world wars because it sought to wage a global conflict without being a world power in economic and raw materials terms¹. The same applies, even more so, to Japan and Italy. As for the First World War, Ferguson also points out that the public debt of Britain, France and the United States rose more than that of Germany, because “unlike Britain, France, Italy and Russia, Germany had no access to the international bond market during the war (having initially spurned the New York market and subsequently been excluded from it). Whilst the Entente powers continued to place bonds in the United States and the capital-rich British Empire, the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey) could rely only on their own resources. Berlin and Vienna were important financial centres, but they lacked the influence of London, Paris and New York”².

Equally interesting is what B.H. Liddell Hart, one of the leading military historians, writes regarding the differing availability of critical raw materials to the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) compared to the Allies during the Second World War. At the time, there were a number of basic commodities essential for the war effort: coal, oil, cotton (for explosives), wool, steel, rubber, copper (for armaments in general and electrical equipment), nickel, asbestos and lead (for ammunition), glycerine (for dynamite), cellulose, mercury (for detonators), aluminium (for aircraft), platinum, antimony, manganese (for metallurgy), mica (as an insulator), nitric acid and sulphur (for explosives). Although Britain had only coal within its metropolitan territory, most of these raw materials were available within its empire; for example, around 90% of the nickel used worldwide came from Canada. Russia, too, had abundant reserves of most raw materials. But the United States was the power in the best position, boasting two-thirds of the world’s oil production, about half of that of cotton and copper, and being dependent on foreign sources for only a few products. The situation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis was very different. Italy and Japan had to import every necessary raw material. Germany was in a better position, but lacked cotton, rubber, tin, bauxite, mercury and mica, whilst its sources of raw iron, copper, antimony, manganese, nickel, sulphide, wool and oil were inadequate. It was above all the shortage of the latter that was felt most keenly. “Here, – comments Liddell Hart – lay the greatest weakness in the Axis’s ability to wage war, at a time when armies were increasingly dependent on motorised transport, and the air force had become a vital element of military power”³.

Germany waged the two world wars precisely to become a world power and to secure the territory and resources necessary for this objective⁴. The strategy Germany would follow during the Second World War was already expressed very clearly in 1925 by Hitler in Mein Kampf, in which he outlined his political programme. Hitler writes that Germany’s territory is too small to guarantee it the status of a world power, on a par with the United States and the British Empire⁵. Regarding war, Hitler states that a war against France had to be envisaged for the sole purpose of neutralising the possibility of an attack from the west. This would have allowed Germany to turn its attention with confidence to its true objective: expansion to the east⁶. Hitler criticised previous German governments for having committed their resources to acquiring colonies outside Europe.

Instead, Germany was to acquire not colonies in Africa or Asia but territories in Eastern Europe. The aim was, in fact, not only to expand Germany’s territorial base but to conquer an area rich in raw materials, including abundant oil reserves, necessary for the expansion of German industry. Moreover, the encirclement and defeat of von Paulus’s German army at Stalingrad were due to Hitler’s stubborn determination to reach the oil fields of the Caucasus at any cost, which his economic experts had presented to him as necessary for the continuation of the war.

Obviously, the goal of expansion to the east was achievable only by defeating the USSR. Instead, Hitler had sought to reach a compromise with the British, because his vision envisaged the coexistence of the German and British empires, both expressions of the Germanic race. In Mein Kampf, England, together with Italy, is identified as Germany’s only possible ally⁷. Criticism of previous German governments was also due to the fact that the scramble for colonies outside Europe had put Germany on a collision course with Great Britain. Thus, Germany’s war against the USSR was not a “pre-emptive” war, aimed at thwarting an imminent Soviet attack. Reports from German agents and the embassy in Moscow ruled out the possibility that the USSR was about to attack Germany. The first to suggest that the Soviets were preparing an offensive was Hitler himself, in order to overcome the General Staff’s reluctance to launch an invasion of the USSR. But, as Liddell Hart writes, “After crossing the border, the generals found scant signs of preparations for an offensive near the frontier and thus realised that Hitler had deceived them”⁸. Incidentally, one demonstration of the Soviet defensive posture was that Stalin had moved the Soviet industrial base away from the border, to the Urals, making use of the country’s vast expanse, precisely in anticipation of an attack from the West. This decision was crucial in enabling the Soviets to exploit the full potential of their manufacturing industry, which had grown enormously thanks to planning in the years leading up to the war.

But let us return to the present day. Trump administration’s Project Vault, the large strategic reserve of raw materials, has access to funding of as much as $12 billion, almost all of it public. At present, it is impossible to avoid purchasing critical minerals from China, especially refined metals. It was for this reason that some car factories, even in the US, were forced to halt production when China blocked the export of rare earths a few months ago. China controls the refining of 19 out of 20 critical metals, with an average global share of 70%, which rises to 90% in the case of rare earths and gallium. The US is also dependent on external sources, to the extent that for years American companies have risked running out of critical minerals during periods of market disruption. In particular, they are 100% dependent on imports for 12 out of 50 minerals considered critical, while for a further 28, imports meet at least 50% of national demand. The two countries on which the US relies most heavily are China and Canada, with 21 minerals each. To address these issues, the US government, in addition to launching Project Vault, has invested in mining and metallurgical companies, in some cases becoming a shareholder. For example, on 26th January [2026], it invested to speed up the launch of a heavy rare-earth mine in Texas and a magnet factory in Oklahoma. Previously, stakes had been acquired in companies, including Canadian ones, and the list of companies in which it holds a stake is certain to grow.

Furthermore, the US is taking steps to seek avenues of cooperation with certain allied countries. It recently organised a summit with 55 other countries to coordinate on the procurement of raw materials. The final declaration of this summit was also signed by the EU and Japan. China’s response was swift, condemning any initiative “that undermines the international economic and trade order by establishing rules for a select few”⁹, and declaring its intention to step up the accumulation of copper in its strategic reserves. However, the US already holds strategic stockpiles for military purposes of 53 different raw materials worth $13 billion, which are stored in the warehouses of the National Defence Stockpile. But, thanks to Project Vault, purchases will become much more extensive. According to Bloomberg, the estimated sum of $12 billion is “more than enough to purchase every single gram of critical minerals consumed annually outside China”¹⁰.

For this reason, there is a serious problem associated with Project Vault. Massive purchases such as those planned by the US risk leaving all other countries empty-handed or, alternatively, making them even more dependent on the US itself. Moreover, this would repeat what happened to Europe, which, no longer receiving Russian gas, has become dependent on US liquefied natural gas. The same trend is emerging with Venezuelan oil, which is once again available, but only on condition that it is purchased through US intermediaries. In this context, Europe finds itself in a more vulnerable position, as it does not have its own strategic mineral reserves, unlike not only the US, but also Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the new US strategy differs from that underpinning the strategic oil reserve, which provides for common rules among OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries and, in the event of an emergency, coordinated management entrusted to the International Energy Agency (IEA), based in Paris.

Thus, faced with increasingly fierce competition for raw materials and, in particular, for critical metals, the US will find itself with an additional tool to bend other countries to its will, including its European allies. There is also another worrying aspect: the strengthening of US autonomy in terms of raw materials makes a potential general war more likely. Until now, in fact, a US attack on China was impossible, due to the interdependence of their economies. Furthermore, the existence of vast arsenals of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent to war between major powers. However, the decoupling of the US and Chinese economies – demonstrated not only by US self-sufficiency in raw materials but also by the sale of US government bonds held by Chinese banks, as urged by the central government – could create the conditions for a conflict to break out in the future. After all, the aim of the National Defense Strategy is to contain China’s rise to become the world’s leading economic power through the threat of overwhelming military force.

In any case, a sort of world war has long been underway between, on the one hand, the US (and its European and Asian allies) and, on the other, China and Russia. This war is being fought through proxies, in countries on the global “periphery”, for example most recently in Ukraine, Venezuela, and the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine). This confrontation is intensifying and is leading to a new arms race even in the “advanced” or “central” countries of the imperialist Triad (the US, Western Europe and Japan), which will result, particularly in Europe, in a reduction in welfare funding and will encourage authoritarian tendencies at the national level. In this regard, unfortunately, we must recall that in the past, particularly at the beginning of the 20th century, the arms race had the effect of provoking the very global conflict that some believed deterrence could avert.

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1. Niall Ferguson, Impero. Come la Gran Bretagna ha fatto il mondo moderno [Original title in English: Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World], Mondadori, Milano 2009, p. 257.

2. Niall Ferguson, Ascesa e declino del denaro. Una storia finanziaria del mondo [Original title in English: The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World], Mondadori, Milano 2009, p. 77.

3. Basil Henry Liddell Hart, History of the Second world war, Da Capo Press, New York 1999, pp. 22-24.

4. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Edizioni clandestine, Massa 2016, p. 279.

5. Idem, p. 277.

6. Idem, p. 287.

7. Idem, p. 252 e 259.

8. Idem, p. 155.

9. Sissi Bellomo, “Minerali critici, Europa messa all’angolo dai piani Usa” [Italian for “Critical minerals: Europe cornered by US plans”], il Sole24ore, 8th February 2026.

10. Ibidem.