Zelensky talks more and more about peace, but what are the prospects?

Today I bring you my English translation of an interesting Telegram post (originally in two parts: 1 and 2, in Italian) of Vittorio Rangeloni, an Italian Journalist (yes, with capital J, as he is a real Journalist, not a “presstitute”!) who has been reporting on the Russo-Ukrainian war from Donbass since 2015.

The post was originally published on 2nd July 2024.

(Please mind that the meme below is not part of the original post!)

Zelensky talks more and more about peace, but what are the prospects?

He did so again today [2nd July 2024] with Orban, having spoken at the European Council and before that at the conference in Switzerland.

In a recent interview with The Philadelphia Inquirer, Vladimir Zelensky spoke for the first time about the possibility of peace talks with the Russian Federation through intermediaries, as was the case with the grain agreements, where Kiev and Moscow negotiated indirectly with the mediation of Turkey and the UN.

These are statements that go in the opposite direction to the line held until now by Zelensky, who had repeatedly ruled out any negotiations before the liberation of all Ukrainian territories, including those of the Lugansk and Donetsk republics, which have been independent from Kiev for over 10 years.

The Ukrainian president no longer seems so categorical about wanting to restore the 1991 borders (thus regaining all of Donbass and Crimea), leaving room for the possibility of stopping the war and thus making compromises. On the one hand he reiterates the concept of a 'just peace' and calls for admission into NATO and the EU, on the other he understands and admits that his view on the conflict differs from that of the leaders of the West.

Russia and Ukraine are still far from finding common ground. But what could happen in Ukraine when the cannon mouths cool down for good?

In the wake of the Maidan, Ukrainian society, which had always been heterogeneous, was split by politics characterised by increasingly radical positions, where all forms of dissent were banned. Zelensky, who was elected because he was seen as an alternative to the war party that had been at the helm of the country since 2014 and a figure who could reconcile different positions and thus bring peace, soon threw off the mask by proving to be even more liberticidal and repressive than his predecessor Poroshenko.

In 2022, with the beginning of the new phase of the conflict, Zelensky did everything he could to involve and radicalise even that part of society that had hitherto remained distant and disinterested in politics, thus trying to unite the population around him, with moderate success.

Zelensky exploited the Russian offensive to create a new “Ukrainianness”, from Lviv to Avdeevka: a shared national identity that had never been perceived before due to the ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences present. He immediately used strong tones, without half-measures, promising a crushing victory over Russia, entry into NATO and the EU. Even in the most difficult moments, he tried to keep the country united by announcing counter-offensives and new victories, strong in Western support. To underline its line, it had even banned negotiations with Moscow by law. Today, these promises are already forgotten: despite the best weapons from half the world and billions of dollars received, Ukraine has not achieved any of its goals. Illusions have dissipated in the face of a reality made up of flowers and yellow-and-blue flags on the countless graves in Ukrainian cemeteries (which could have been avoided or at least limited).

Every day Russia continues to advance on almost all sectors of the front, step by step. It is impossible to imagine that in the face of this, at any moment, Moscow could withdraw its troops, abandoning to its fate the population of the new regions, which - for the most part - after all that has happened in the past 10 years, does not want to come back under Kiev's control.

Consequently, for Zelensky, peace risks turning into a double-edged sword. On the one hand, if the Ukrainian president does not bring about peace, continuing to lose control of more and more territories, he could be accused of asking the population to make huge, sometimes inhuman sacrifices, sending hundreds of thousands of men to the slaughter because of his ambitions, destroying the country's economy and any prospect of development without having achieved practically anything.

If, on the other hand, Zelensky decides to negotiate, and thus consider Russia's position on the new regions, in conjunction with the will of the people living in these areas, he would automatically betray all the promises he has made over the past two years to the Ukrainians and his soldiers, especially the more radical fringes, to whom he owes so much. Of course, many in Ukraine are waiting for the end of the conflict and are praying for it, those who wanted to fight voluntarily have been at the front for some time. Many men of conscription age are hiding at home, so as not to risk being caught by the army commissars; the inhabitants of the regions most exposed to the conflict would be the first to rejoice; businessmen are only waiting for stability and guarantees of security. Yet it is clear that the will of the masses finds relative consideration. The specific weight of the ultranationalists over the years has gradually increased thanks to support from above. Marginal groups have been transformed by state propaganda into veritable myths (think of Azovstal). For Zelensky, they represented an indispensable element in forming the hard core of the armed forces.

However, this game risks backfiring. The Azov Chief of Staff Bogdan Krotevich, in response to Zelensky's openness to negotiations, has already stated that “there can be no peace without victory”, threatening that the president would come to a “bad end” if he were to negotiate with Moscow.

In order to get society to accept any compromises, Zelensky will have to reduce the influence of these structures, thus risking the collapse of the foundations of the new “Ukrainianness”, bringing to the surface countless issues left unresolved and related to the country's real interests, language minorities, repression of religion, management of the economy, etc. Sooner or later it will be time to come to terms with all this.

✍️ RangeloniNews (https://t.me/vn_rangeloni)

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