The Trump administration was created to stop the new multipolar world

Dec 01, 2024

What follows is my English translation of an article by Domenico Moro, originally in Italian, published on ComeDonChisciotte.org on Thursday 28th November 2024. (All emphasis mine. Footnotes original, with some additions). This translation comes at the right time, as Donald Trump, just wrote the following on X:

Defining the future scenarios of the Trump presidency is difficult because campaign promises and declarations will have to be measured against a reality that is very complex for the US.
To understand why Trump won the election we have to look at the big picture. The US has long been going through a phase of decline, which is both economic and hegemonic. Russia and especially China are challenging the historical dominance of the US. But there are many states in the global South that are questioning the old world order dating back to the Bretton Woods Accords of 1944, which enshrined the dominance of the US and the dollar worldwide.
To halt this decline, the US, driven mainly by the neo-conservative current, has in recent decades adopted an aggressive imperialist policy that has not resolved the situation but accelerated its decline. This aggressive strategy has been advocated by the dominant bloc in a bipartisan manner. But, faced with the failures of the strategy adopted so far, a tendency has grown within the ruling elite to change course.
In fact, a split within the ruling class has arisen due to the US crisis, which has broken the traditional bipartisan consensus that was in place especially in foreign policy. The fraction of the elite that is for change has resorted to an outsider away from the traditional parties, Trump, and to political populism, exploiting the economic contradictions that have impoverished millions of Americans. The virulence of the campaign, with its particularly heated tone, and the attempts to eliminate Trump by judicial means and even physically, are a reflection of a strong political tension within the US ruling class such as has not been observed in a long time. Trump is supported by several sectors of capital, starting with the most innovative ones in cryptocurrencies and big tech, represented by Elon Musk, but also by Jeff Bezos, the patron of Amazon, who prevented the newspaper he owns, the influential Washington Post, from giving its traditional support to the Democrats and Kamala Harris, and then congratulating Trump, by no means taken for granted, once he was elected.
Trump's strategy has a better chance this time around. In the first term, the victory was almost unexpected and Trump did not have the political personnel to implement his decisions. Moreover, the bureaucracy, civil and military, was hostile towards him. In the second term, on the other hand, Trump came prepared, with an adequate political staff and, above all, loyal to him. Trump is quite advanced in age and will not be able to run again in the next election, but a new, relatively young ruling class is forming that can implement the new strategy in the long term. Within this new ruling class, there is also Vice-President J.D. Vance, who could be the candidate in the next presidential election. In this new political staff, there are also younger elements of the neo-conservatives, while the older and now “decadent” ones have been removed.
Trump's political strategy is in continuity with the traditional one. What differentiates it is the way in which this strategy is implemented. Here there is a real break with the past. However, Trump's is not an isolationist strategy, as some have wanted to portray it. Trump fits into the groove of US imperialism, with the declared aim of restoring the US position of hegemony, as is clear from Trump's campaign slogan: ‘Make America Great Again’. It is clear that such a programme cannot be realised by retreating into oneself, but rather by projection outwards, certainly in new ways and with new objectives, but still with decisive intervention on the international stage.
For the US, the external, international aspect, i.e. its being (still) the world's hegemonic power, is the most important, for the simple reason that without the dominance of the dollar and the US Armed Forces, the domestic economy would risk collapse. For instance, without the dollar as a trade and reserve currency, the US would not be able to sustain its double trade and government debt. For this reason, even if international policy issues were not given the necessary prominence in the election campaign, and “domestic” policy issues such as immigration, abortion, tariffs, inflation and workers' purchasing power, etc., were dealt with, the external aspect is predominant over the internal one.
Thus, the most important elements of change are related to US international strategy and those aspects of domestic policy that facilitate its implementation. To date, US strategy has been influenced by theories such as that of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Polish-born but naturalised US national security advisor during the Carter presidency (1977-1981). Brzezinski's analysis, set out in his most successful book, “The Great Chessboard” (1998), echoes the theories of British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), the founder of geopolitics. Mackinder believed that there was the Heartland, literally the “heart of the earth”, which represented the centre of the huge Eurasian continent, containing most of the world's raw materials and population. Control of the Heartland implied control of the Eurasian continent, which, in turn, allowed control of the World. The important point to note is that the Heartland corresponded to the Russian Empire, from which it follows that whoever controls Eastern Europe controls the Heartland. Mackinder's theory was based on a conception of history and geopolitics as a struggle between land powers and thalassocratic powers, i.e. powers that based their power on control of the sea, like Britain before and the USA today. His theory aimed to push Britain against the possibility that a land power could control Eurasia, perhaps through an alliance between highly industrialised Germany and raw material-rich Russia.
Brzezinski, who, it should not be forgotten, was Polish and harboured hostility towards Russia, therefore believed that even today the US should try to control Eastern Europe, prevent German industrial power from merging with Russia's immense natural wealth and, above all, weaken Russia as a power and as an autonomous state. The key to weakening Russia is the eastward expansion of NATO, which in effect has encompassed almost all Eastern European countries, thus pressing Russia to its borders. But even more important is the control of Ukraine, without which, again according to Brzezinski, there is no Russian power. Hence, the “colour revolution” of 2014 that permanently distanced Ukraine from Russia. It is clear that, according to US strategy, based on the above-mentioned concepts, Europe, especially Eastern Europe and Ukraine, is the key piece of its strategy and NATO the instrument of this strategy, which led to the recent war between Russia and Ukraine.
This strategy, however, has two serious flaws. The first is that it is proving to be unsuccessful, as Ukraine and NATO are on the verge of being defeated by Russia, as French sociologist Emmanuel Todd pointed out in “The Defeat of the West”1. The second, and more important, is that the world has changed a lot since 1998, when the Grand Chessboard was written. The most important aspect of this change is the emergence of the economic and political power of China. The pivot of the World is no longer the Atlantic axis and Europe but East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, where the majority of the world's production and population is concentrated. Trump, and especially the fraction of the US bourgeoisie that supports him, believe for these reasons that the “grand strategy” should be recalibrated: no longer against Russia but against China, which is identified as the real systemic adversary.
But let us look at the various scenarios that are being defined, starting with the economic one. Firstly, it should be noted that the “Make America Great again” programmes have given a favourable boost to the dollar, which has risen by 6% against the Euro, to the shares of US companies and to Wall Street, which is just below the highest levels. But what are the new measures included in Trump's programme? There are three such measures. The first is the reduction of corporate taxes from 21% to 15%. The second consists in the imposition of duties of 10-20% on “friendly” countries (Europe) and up to 60% on “hostile” ones (China) [Well… according to Trump’s latest tweet, all BRICS countries that dump the US Dollar now face the risk of 100% tariff!], with the aim of rebalancing the US's huge trade deficit with the rest of the world and rebuilding its industrial base. The third is the fight against immigration.
The consequences of these measures, however, would not be very favourable to the US. First of all, all the measures listed will lead to higher inflation, especially the increase in tariffs, which will increase the price of imported goods and go against the interests of many of those who voted Trump because of the reduction in their purchasing power during the years of the Biden presidency. In particular, the reduction in the purchasing power of the poorest households would be 4.2% compared to less than 1% for the richest ones2. Moreover, the effectiveness of tariffs is doubtful, as those introduced so far have neither reduced the foreign trade deficit nor contributed to the re-industrialisation of the US. It has to be said, however, that the announced levels of tariffs may only be a negotiating basis for the revival of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a forum for wide-ranging dispute settlement in due course. In any case, for now, the incoming Trump administration is leaning towards bilateral agreements, in the opposite direction to the multilateralism typical of the WTO. As for the corporate tax cuts, this measure will cost the US Treasury USD 600 billion over ten years and will result in an increase in debt issuance, aggravating the interest burden, which recently broke through the USD 1 trillion barrier. The total state debt may thus rise well above 123% of GDP, the level at which it stood in 2024. It remains to be seen whether the reduction in corporate taxes will be offset by cuts in government spending, which could be identified by the specific efficiency department entrusted by Trump to Elon Musk. It is thus clear that, in his intentions, Trump aims to favour capital, from banks, to energy, to big tech, through deregulation, tax cuts, and protectionist tariffs.
The other scenario is the geopolitical one, which, as we have said, is expected to undergo a drastic strategic change. During his election campaign, Trump said he would end the two ongoing wars, the one in Ukraine and the one in the Middle East, in a short time. It will certainly take longer than stated but, given his intention to focus on the Indo-Pacific and the knowledge that keeping the Ukrainian conflict open strengthens the Russia-North Korea-Iran axis with China right behind, it seems likely that Trump intends to end the war against Russia that Ukraine cannot fight without US help. Not to mention that Trump earlier this year opposed a vote to send new aid to Ukraine and that Republican Senators Chairman John Thune, while not a strict Trumpian, has stated that he will work closely with the administration on blocking new aid to Ukraine. Finally, Tulsi Gabbard, considered not hostile to Putin and Bashar Assad, was appointed by Trump as director of national security. Meanwhile, the Biden administration agreed to the use of long-range missiles (operated by NATO personnel) against Russian territory, leaving a hot potato for Trump when he takes office in the White House on 21st January [2025].
A different attitude appears to be defined with regard to the Middle East. Here, the Trump administration's main target will be Iran, towards which it is prepared to take a tougher approach, betting on the fact that Iran's weakness towards Israel will not lead to war. Trump's chosen ministers confirm the hard line against Iran, which is considered an enemy both because of the nuclear risk and in the Middle East conflict. Mike Waltz, the new National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State (Foreign Minister), and Pete Hegseth, Defence Minister, have always had an aggressive approach towards Iran and China. After all, in his first term Trump had harshly approached Iran, tearing up the 2015 nuclear agreement signed by Obama, and placing hundreds of sanctions. Moreover, it was on Trump's orders that Supreme Commander Qassem Soleimani was killed by a US raid in Baghdad in 2020. The aggression towards Iran can be understood not only in light of Iran's leadership of the Axis of Resistance (which unites Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemeni Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias with Iran), but also in light of Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz, strategic for the passage of oil tankers, and the fact that almost all Iranian oil shipments are directed towards the US strategic enemy, China. Beyond Iran, support for Israel remains firm, not least because the Trumpian team is composed of many pro-Zionists. Support for Israel, however, should be limited to not pushing “moderate” Arab regimes into the arms of Russia and Iran. Essentially, Trump's goal is the revitalisation of the Abraham Accords (2020), which normalised relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, perhaps extending them to other Arab regimes in the area, starting with Saudi Arabia.
It is the EU, and Western Europe in particular, that will pay for the Trump presidency's choices. This, after the Covid crises and the war in Ukraine, has increased its pharmaceutical, energy and military dependence on the US. Trump's arrival risks giving it a further blow. First of all there are the 10-20% tariffs, which will penalise European exports to the US with an expected collapse of 25% and a drastic contraction of the trade surplus that in 2023 had reached 157 billion dollars3. The biggest repercussions will be for Germany and Italy, which exported $67.3 billion worth of goods to the US in 2023 (+3.4% year-on-year). To make the situation more difficult, the high tariffs on China will divert many products to the EU market with the consequence of worsening the latter's trade deficit with the Asian country. But that's not enough, it is very likely that Trump will return to the issue of too low military spending by European countries, moving from the old demand of 2% of GDP to 3%. Added to this, in the event of Trump's disengagement from the war, the offloading of Ukraine onto Europe's shoulders will result in increased aid contributions to Ukraine in a context where continental public debts are under stress.
Let us now come to the centrepiece, China. As mentioned several times, for Trump, China is the systemic adversary and the Indo-Pacific region is the strategic priority. The US strategy against China will be based primarily on escalating the trade war by imposing very high tariffs (up to 60 per cent). The imposition of tariffs, however, is not such a simple matter. Firstly, many Chinese exports to the US pass through third countries such as Vietnam, Australia and other eastern countries. Secondly, China has powerful weapons of retaliation, which are based, firstly, on restricting exports of strategic raw materials for the energy transition that are not easily replaced by other supply chains; secondly, China can in turn impose tariffs on imports that would make it difficult for Western companies to access the huge Chinese market. Besides on the commercial level, the Trumpian strategy towards China is also expressed on the strategic military level, i.e. in the construction of an offensive containment belt around China, perhaps through the extension of NATO's operational range in the Pacific or, more likely, in the construction of a Pacific NATO. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that in 2021 AUKUS, a strategic partnership between the US, the UK and Australia for the containment of China in the Indo-Pacific, was founded. The possibility of an open and direct conflict is made difficult by the interdependence between China and the US, but the reasons for the outbreak of a conflict are still there, starting with the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its national territory and which holds a very important strategic position, located as it is only 150 kilometres from the coast of China. Taiwan not only makes transit to the open sea problematic for the Chinese navy, but above all represents a knife at the People's Republic's throat.
Summarising what has been said in this excursus, the Trump presidency will be anything but oriented towards renouncing the hegemonic role of the US. On the contrary, it will be aimed at reconstructing the material and political conditions of US world dominance, which has been cracking in recent decades. In any case, the new administration has absolutely no intention of consenting to the birth of a new multipolar world. But whether Trump and his successors will be able to reverse the trend of decline and prevent the birth of a multipolar world remains to be seen.

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